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Abstract
Which kind of social capital fosters the diffusion of development-oriented trust? This paper
carries out an empirical investigation into the causal relationships connecting four types of
social capital (i.e. bonding, bridging, linking, and corporate), and different forms of trust
(knowledge-based trust, social trust, trust towards public services and political institutions), in
a community of entrepreneurs located in the Italian industrial district of the Tuscia. Our
results suggest that the main factors fostering the diffusion of social trust among
entrepreneurs are the perception that the local community is a safe place, and the
establishment of corporate ties through professional associations. Trust in people is positively
and significantly correlated also to higher levels of satisfaction and confidence in public
services. Participation in voluntary organizations does not appear to increase trust in people.
Rather, we find evidence of the other way round: interpersonal trust seems to encourage civic
engagement.
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1. Introduction
Social capital is one of the most popular and controversial topics in the contemporary debate.
Following Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti’s seminal work, most studies define the concept as the
features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more
effectively to pursue shared objectives (1993). Although such definition is widely accepted in the
literature, it implies a range of relevant problems both for theoretical and empirical research.
Networks, norms, and trust do not necessarily act in the same way, and the nature of their
relationships needs to be carefully assessed every time. First, some kinds of networks can hamper
the diffusion of trust and cooperative values, thereby exerting a negative influence on well-being
and development. Second, considering trust as social capital leads to treat the concept as good and
desirable by definition, without taking into the proper account its complexity. Trust is in fact an
indispensable asset for the economic activity, due to its ability to promote cooperation and to
improve the efficiency of markets (Arrow, 1974, Dasgupta, 2000). In the long run, trust has been
acknowledged as a factor causing economic growth by the empirical literature (Knack and Keefer,
1999, Zak and Knack, 2001, Dincer and Uslaner, 2007). Hence, if we define (and measure) social
capital as trust, any empirical testing will tautologically find that social capital plays a positive role
for the economic activity. Moreover, trust must be considered as a multidimensional concept just
like social capital. Besides the “social” trust referred to by growth studies, the literature has in fact
identified other facets of the concept, each one being connected to certain interpersonal
relationships.
Also due to such conceptual ambiguities, both in the social psychology and the economics literature
there is a surprising lack of studies addressing the role of social capital’s various sub-dimensions (as
given by different types of networks) in the accumulation of social trust, with the few exceptions
providing partial evidence and sometimes conflicting results.
In this paper, we take trust and social capital separately, providing a definition of social capital as
networks of relationships cemented by repeated interactions and shared values, and suggesting that
the economic effects of such networks should be assessed in relation to their role in the
“socialization” of trust. The complexity of the two concepts is accounted for through the definition
of four types of social capital – as shaped by bonding, bridging, linking, and corporate networks –
and the consideration of different levels of trust – i.e. social trust, knowledge-based trust, trust
towards the institutions and trust in public services.
Our empirical analysis carries out an assessment of the relationships connecting trust’s and social
capital’s sub-dimensions. More in particular, we aim to shed light on which type of social capital
may enhance the diffusion of “development-oriented” trust. To this purpose, we have collected
2
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micro data on trust and social capital on the field through the submission of a questionnaire to a
community of small entrepreneurs and other stakeholders of the Italian industrial district of the
Tuscia, located about 60 miles north of Rome.
This case study is of general interest for at least two reasons. First, industrial districts (IDs) are a
central feature of the Italian model of development, largely based on the driving force of small and
medium enterprises. Starting from Marshall (1886), the related literature has emphasised concepts
such as the “industrial atmosphere”, and the long-term socio-economic relationships among local
firms, involving trust and a blend of competition and collaboration, to explain the superior
economic performance of regions such as the Third Italy, or Silicon Valley in the US (Becattini,
2004, Becattini and Dardi, 2006, Bellandi, 2006). IDs can thus be seen as incubators for the
development of those trust-intensive relations which stimulate transactions and growth. Second, this
model of development is currently facing a major challenge, since globalization’s processes are
posing a threat just to the socio-economic ties that function as the glue holding together IDs
(Bertolini and Giovannetti, 2006, Amighini and Rabellotti, 2005, Mariotti et al, 2008).
The econometric strategy is articulated in two stages. First a series of probit analyses is run to
explore the effects of different types of networks on “social” or “generalized” trust. Then, the
relationships between the forms of social capital and the different types of trust are assessed by
means of structural equations models (SEMs).
Our results suggest that, in the Tuscia district, the main factors fostering the diffusion of social trust
are the perception that the local community is a safe place, and the establishment of corporate ties
through professional associations. Trust in people is positively and significantly correlated also to
higher levels of satisfaction and confidence in public services. Participation in voluntary
organizations does not appear to increase trust in people. Rather, we find evidence of the other way
round: interpersonal trust seems to encourage civic engagement. The correlation between
participation and social trust may be created in a self-selection process where people who are
already high social trusters are more likely to join and become active in organizations and networks.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold. First, we provide an assessment of the
role exerted by different types of networks in the accumulation of trust, which is the catalyst
sparking off the positive action of social capital on the economy and well-being. Second, we
contribute to shedding light on some conceptual ambiguities that have plagued the previous
literature. More in particular, the analysis acknowledges the multidimensionality of social capital,
addressing the so far quite neglected role of family and corporate ties. Our findings also provide
some hints for better understanding the “direction” of the causal nexus connecting trust and civic
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participation. Third, we enrich the “traditional” tripartition of the forms of social capital by
introducing a new category shaped by corporate ties.
The outline of the paper is as follows: the next two sections introduce the concepts of trust and
social capital through a review of the literature. Section four presents some hypotheses on the
determinants of trust. Sections five and six present the results of the probit and the SEM analyses.
The survey is closed by a discussion of such results and some concluding remarks.
2. Trust and the economic activity
Although the huge amount of research on trust, a concise and universally accepted definition of the
concept remains elusive. As a consequence, the term trust is used in a variety of distinct, and not
always compatible, ways (Kramer, 1999).
Influential definitions consider trust as a general attitude or expectancy about other people and the
social system in which they are embedded (Garfinkel, 1963, Luhmann, 1988, Hardin, 2001). In
other words, trust is people’s belief in others’ good intentions, that is, others’ intentions not to harm
them, to respect their rights, and to carry out obligations (Igarashi et al, 2008). According to Schul
et al (2008), “A state of trust is associated with a feeling of safety. The environment is as it
normally is and things really are as they appear to be. Thus, individuals see no reason to refrain
from doing what they routinely do. Ordinarily, when the stakes are not high, trust is the default
state, so that without thinking much about the other, individuals feel the environment is normal and
there is no need to worry” (2008, 1293). Distrust, in contrast, is associated with the concealment of
truth and a lack of transparency. It is a state of uncertainty, but not the kind associated with
outcomes that are inherently probabilistic, as in playing a slot machine or roulette. Rather, distrust
reflects the receiver’s perception of the source’s intention (to mislead) and, potentially, the
receiver’s theory about the truth (Schul et al, 2007).
Given such definitions, it is easy to state that the diffusion of trust is an indispensable lubricant for
the economic activity: if individuals feel safe and act routinely, their behavior is more easily
foreseeable, thereby causing a reduction in monitoring costs which stimulates transactions. In the
words of Arrow: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust,
certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of
the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence” (1972,
357). Most studies show that enterprises devote an ever more share of their financial resources to
activities which are not directly related to their production processes. Nurturing a cooperative
climate inside the workforce and building trustworthy relationships both inside the firm and with
external partners generally constitute a key task for management. If human interactions within the
4
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workforce are trustworthy and relaxed, employees are more inclined to do their best at work, and
are more likely to sanction shirking behaviours through peer monitoring. Salamon and Robinson
(2008) show that, when employees in an organization perceive they are trusted by management,
increases in the presence of responsibility norms, as well as in the sales performance and customer
service performance of the organization, are observed in a sample of 88 retail stores in Canada. In a
study on the Italian regions, Sabatini (2008a) finds that operating in a social environment rich of
bridging and linking ties significantly raises labour productivity in small and medium enterprises.
The results from a study of 545 managers in China carried out by Zhang et al (2008) show that
trustworthy and supportive relationships between employees and managers nurture workers’ trust in
the organization, with beneficial effects in terms of effort and productivity.
3. Trust: definition and measurement
While the importance of trust is commonly accepted by the literature, the definition of which kind
of trust works as a lubricant for the economic activity is still open to question. In one of the most
influential economic studies on trust, Knack and Keefer (1997) state that “Trust-sensitive
transactions include those in which goods and services are provided in exchange for future
payment, employment contracts in which managers rely on employees to accomplish tasks that are
difficult to monitor, and investments and savings decisions that rely on assurances by governments
or banks that they will not expropriate these assets” (1997, 1252). Even if the authors do not draw
any classification of the concept, it possible to argue that their notion of trust involves people who
never met before or, in a simple word, strangers. Trust towards strangers is often referred to as
“generalized trust”. Uslaner (2002) prefers to call it “moralistic trust”, in that it noes depend upon
information and experience. Instead, “It is a commandment to treat people as if they were
trustworthy … Moralistic trust is the belief that others share your fundamental moral values and
therefore should be treated as you would wish to be treated by them … Moralistic trust is not a
prediction of how others will behave. Even if other people turn out not to be trustworthy, moral
values require you to behave as if they could be trusted” (Uslaner, 2002, 19). The “moral” roots of
trust are acknowledged also in the social psychology literature: according toYamagishi (1998),
generalized trust is a general belief in human benevolence: that is, it suggests that trustworthiness is
an aspect of human nature.
Still, theoretical studies in economics generally account for a kind of trust which is based on
information and experience. According to Dasgupta (2000), we trust people only when we know
something about their disposition, their available options, their ability and so forth, so we think they
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are trustworthy and expect they will choose to behave themselves. Burt and Knez (1996) define
trust as anticipated cooperation, arguing that the issue is not moral.
This notion of trust is referred to by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) with the term “knowledgebased” trust, which is obviously of crucial importance for the economic activity. Still, this is not the
kind of trust that can benefit the economy “as a whole”, for the simple reason that it is based on the
knowledge we accumulate through experience: in large societies, it is impossible to interact with
every people, so the inference on their behaviour cannot be based on knowledge or experience.
According to Uslaner (2001), “The difference between generalized and particularized trust is
similar to the distinction Putnam (1993, 93) drew between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital.
We bond with our friends and people like ourselves. We form bridges with people who are different
from ourselves. While Putnam argued that both can lead to trust, he held that bridging organizations
would produce much more trust”.
The aim of our empirical analysis is just to shed light on the relationship between the different
dimensions of social capital (i.e. the bonding and the bridging cited above, plus two more types
shaped by linking and corporate ties) and the various forms of trust. More in particular, we will test
whether, and on which bases, social participation could lead us to trust unknown people as if we
had previously encountered them.
Our basic idea is that, in some cases, being part of a network can make us feel more confident both
in the good faith of “others” and in our ability not to be injured by the others’ possible free-riding
behaviours. In other terms, a network member may feel stronger and not defenceless towards the
uncertainty related to social interactions.
3.1 Generalized or social trust
Generalized trust has been measured through the famous question developed by Rosenberg (1956):
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can be too careful
in dealing with people?”. Possible responses to this question are: “Most people can be trusted”,
“Can’t be too careful”, or “Don’t know”. In a second moment, we asked interviewees to assign a
score to the statement “people can be trusted”, the score ranging from 1 to 5, with the aim to build a
social trust indicator to be used within the SEM analysis1.
It is noteworthy that trust measured through surveys is a “micro” and “cognitive” concept, in that it
represents the individuals’ perception of their social environment, related to the particular position
that interviewed people occupy in the social structure. The advisability to aggregate the individuals’
1

The relative question is: to what extent do you agree with the statement “people can be trusted”, where possible
responses are not at all, very little, so-so, quite a lot, very much.
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responses to create a measure of “macro” or “social” trust has been questioned by some authors.
Aggregated data may lose the linkage with the social and historical circumstances in which trust
and social capital are located. As pointed out by Foley and Edwards (1999), empirical studies based
on cross-country comparisons of trust may be a cul de sac, because of their inability to address
macro outcomes, in view of the absence of the broader context within which attitudes are created
and determined. Fine (2001) argues that “if social capital is context-dependent – and context is
highly variable by how, when and whom, then any conclusion are themselves illegitimate as the
basis for generalisation to other circumstances” (Fine 2001, 105). In this paper data have been used
only at the micro level, without carrying out any form of aggregation.
3.2 Trust towards the institutions
The empirical analysis accounts for two types of trust towards public institutions:
a. trust towards political institutions, as measured through the question: “I am going to name a
number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me whether do you feel confidence in
them? Is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or
none at all?”. The relative indicator is the arithmetic mean of the scores given by respondents to
the following items: the national government, the parliament, politicians in general, and political
parties.
b. Trust in public services. This is computed through the same question reported above as the
arithmetic mean of the scores given by interviewees to the court system, bureaucrats of the
public administration, the public health care system, and public transports2. This variable has
been accounted for with the purpose to test Kumlin and Rothstein’s (2005) claims on the role of
the welfare state in the socialization of trust. According to the authors, citizens in developed
welfare states frequently come into direct personal contact with many different types of public
agencies and services. Social insurance, public healthcare, and public transports are but a few
examples of this. In many cases, such institutions can be pervasive factors in people’s daily
lives. So, “It is reasonable to suspect that people’s views of the society around them and of their
fellow human beings are shaped to a great extent through their contacts with such public state
institutions” (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005, 349). The authors’ empirical analysis, based on
Swedish survey data, suggests that contacts with universal welfare-state institutions and efficient
public services tend to increase social trust. In this paper, we address the possible relationship
between the confidence and satisfaction in public services and the diffusion of social trust.

2

In the calculation of both the indicators of trust towards the institutions, scores have been conveniently recoded.
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3.3 Knowledge-based trust
Knowledge-based trust is given by the confidence in well-known people and in people holding a
similar status. This variable is computed as the arithmetic mean of the scores assigned by
respondents to the trustworthiness of the following people: family members, friends, and people in
the neighbourhood. Knowledge-based trust can be considered as one of the transmission channels
promoting the socialization of trust outside the boundaries of closed networks: the trustworthiness
of people we meet regularly could be a crucial factor shaping our confidence in the whole social
environment surrounding us. In this sense, bonding social capital, or the ties we form with people
like ourselves, may indirectly influence social trust through the accumulation of knowledge-based
trust.
4 Social capital: definition and measurement
One of the most popular definitions of social capital refers to the set of “features of social life –
networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue
shared objectives” (Putnam, 1995). In this paper, trust and social capital are separately taken, and
the economic role of the latter is assessed just in relation to its ability to promote the “socialization”
of trust. Of course, from a lexical point of view, it is possible to attribute the “social capital” label to
every aspect of the economy’s social fabric providing a favourable environment for production and
well-being. However, such kind of definition poses a “logic” problem: if social capital is everything
can make agents cooperate or markets work better, then any empirical analysis will find that social
capital causes cooperation among agents and improves the efficiency of markets. This approach
“sterilizes” the empirical research on social capital, making it unable to foster the explanatory
power of studies addressing the socio-cultural factors of growth3.
In our empirical analysis, social capital is identified with networks of relationships cemented by
repeated interactions and shared values. However, both everyday-life experience and previous
empirical studies suggest that social networks may play a double-sided role in economic
development and well-being (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Coates and Heckelman, 2003, Sabatini,
2008b). On the one side, they are a fertile ground for nurturing trust and shared values, which
reduce monitoring costs and facilitate transactions. Repeated interactions among group members
3

This statement applies not only to studies defining social capital as trust. Most empirical studies measure social capital
through “indirect” indicators, not representing the social capital’s key components already identified by the theoretical
literature (commonly social networks, trust and social norms). Such indicators – e.g. crime rates, teenage pregnancy,
blood donation, participation rates in tertiary education – are quite popular in the empirical research, but their use has
led to considerable confusion about what social capital is, as distinct from its outcomes, and what the relationship
between social capital and its outcomes may be. Research reliant upon an outcome of social capital as an indicator of it
will necessarily find social capital to be related to that outcome. Social capital becomes tautologically present whenever
an outcome is observed (Portes, 1998, Durlauf, 1999, Fine, 2001).

8
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper305

8

Sabatini: Does Social Capital Create Trust? Evidence from a Community

foster the diffusion of information raising reputations’ relevance. The higher opportunity cost of
free-riding in prisoners’ dilemma kind of situations makes the agents’ behaviour more foreseeable
causing an overall reduction of uncertainty. Therefore, an increase in trust-based relations may
reduce the average cost of transactions, just as an increase in physical capital reduces the average
cost of production. However, networks can work in the opposite direction as well: members of a
group may use their ties as a means for the pursuit of narrow sectarian interests, and organizations
may lobby against the interest of other groups. The distinction between bonding, bridging, linking,
and corporate social capital reflects the different roles that networks may play in shaping the
economic development of a society.
4.1 Bonding social capital
The term “bonding” holds a negative connotation and generally refers to small circles of
homogeneous people that do not cooperate with other outside the boundaries of the group. The
literature has often focused on the family as a potential form of bonding social capital. In his
pioneer study, Banfield (1958) partly attributed the backwardness of Southern Italy to the inability
of citizens “to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the
immediate, material interest of the nuclear family” (1958, 10). According to the author, any family
activity was oriented towards the protection and consolidation of the isolated family unit. “Moral”
activity (i.e. any action informed by moral norms of trust and reciprocity) was seen as limited to
family insiders, with outsiders only being significant as a potential resource to exploit for the
family. Applying Banfield’s claims to the purposes of this paper, we can argue that strong family
ties may act as a factor hampering the diffusion of social or generalized trust. In our analysis, we
have measured bonding social capital as the arithmetic mean of the frequency of the encounters
with a range of familiars, as measured through the question “How many times in the past 12 months
did you meet your familiars?”, where possible responses are “everyday”, “once or more a week”,
“once or more a month”, “once or more a year”, “never”, and “I have not living familiars”, with
reference to the interviewee’s parents, brothers, and children4.
4.2 Bridging social capital
Bridging social capital is given by horizontal ties shaping heterogeneous groups of people with
different backgrounds. The term bridging refers to the ability of such networks to create “bridges”
4

Responses have been conveniently recoded. We chose indicators of the intensity of relationships, instead of
accounting for alternative measures, with the purpose to focus on a “structural”, not cognitive, and more reliable
measure of family ties. Of course, the choice of indicators for the measurement of intangible phenomena is always
questionable. For extensive reviews on social capital’s measurement problems, see for example Durlauf and Fafchamps
(2006) and Sabatini (2007).
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connecting sectors of society that, otherwise, would have never come into contact. The common
claim is that such relationships have positive effects on the diffusion of information and trust, thus
fostering transactions and economic growth. In this paper, bridging social capital is measured by the
frequency of the encounters with friends, as captured through the question “How many times in the
past 12 months did you meet your friends?”. The basic idea is that bridging social capital can be
accumulated not only through individual investment decisions, but also as an accidental by-product
of the simultaneous production and consumption of relational goods. It is worth noting that the
relationship between (production and consumption of) relational goods and the accumulation of
social capital has a double direction. On the one side, a higher social capital increases the returns to
the time spent in social participation. For instance, it is easier and more rewarding going out with
friends in a context that offers many options for socially enjoyed leisure. On the other side, a higher
social participation brings about social capital accumulation as a by-product. According to Antoci,
Sacco and Vanin (2007), trust and empathy may be reinforced and generalized through social
interactions.
4.3 Linking social capital
The term linking social capital describes ties connecting individuals, or the groups they belong to,
to people or groups in position of political or financial power. For example, civil society
organizations allow citizens to come into contact with the institutions to carry out advocacy
activities through collective action. This kind of networks is critical for leveraging resources, ideas
and information beyond normal community linkages and, therefore, may play a significant role for
social well-being. However, the role of organizations in development is widely debated in the
literature. Economic studies suggest that much depends on the context where NGOs’ activities take
place. Knack and Keefer (1997) sustain that cooperation and solidarity connected with the presence
of voluntary associations work better at the level of smaller communities. In the authors’ words: “If
the economic goals of a group conflict with those of other groups or of unorganized interests, the
overall effect of group memberships and activities on economic performance could be negative …
Although the ability of groups to articulate their interests is likely to be an important restraint on
government, it also provides groups a way to capture private benefits at the expense of society”
(1997, 1271).
Networks related to civic engagement have been historically measured through the density of
voluntary organizations. However, there are some reasons to doubt the efficacy of such indicator:
besides a range of problems like self-selection and homogeneity among group members, it is worth
pointing out that face-to-face interactions inside voluntary organizations could be modest and not
10
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necessarily imply the sharing of information and values. This is particularly true in advanced
economies, where participation in voluntary organizations is often limited to an annual subscription
related to the payment of a membership fee. This kind of civic participation may have small
spillovers effects, scarcely contributing to the diffusion of trust. In the light of these arguments,
following a path traced in Sabatini (2008c), we measure civic participation through the density of
voluntary organizations (i.e. the average number of organizations in which interviewees are
involved, or the so-called “Putnam’s instrument”), and the degree of members’ involvement in the
associational life. The latter is captured through the frequency of meetings5, the performance of
unpaid work as a volunteer for an association6, the making of payments for funding associational
activities7, and the willingness to give concrete help to strangers in need in the context of
volunteering activities, considered as the most demanding way of participation8. The synthetic
indicator of linking social capital is computed as the weighted mean of the basic variables, where
weights reflect the level of relational involvement.
4.4 Corporate social capital
As argued by Knack and Keefer (1997), organizations can behave pro-socially as well as antisocially. Volunteer organizations, ecological, human rights and peace associations are generally
considered as a form of positive social capital fostering the socialization of trust. However, other
kinds of formal networks may work in the opposite direction. Olson (1965) was the first to stress
that professional associations, labour unions and political parties pursue the special interests of their
members thereby generating social costs and reducing cohesion. In this paper, we label this kind of
associations as “corporate social capital”, measured by the weighted mean of four variables
capturing a) the density of professional organizations protecting entrepreneurs’ interests and b) the
degree of members’ involvement in the associational life9.
5

The frequency of meetings is measured through the question: “In the last year, have you taken an active part in
gatherings of any of the following groups or associations: associations/groups involved in social, environmental,
religious, cultural, sports or recreational, or voluntary activities? With which frequency?”
6

The relative question is: “In the last year, have you performed unpaid work for any of the following groups of
associations: associations/groups involved in social, environmental, religious, cultural, sports or recreational, or
voluntary activities?”
7

The relative question is: “In the last year, did you make payments to fund any of the following groups of associations:
associations/groups involved in social, environmental, religious, cultural, sports or recreational, or voluntary activities?”
8

The relative question is: “In the last year, did you give some form of concrete help to strangers in need, in the context
of your associational activity?”, where the people in need cannot be relatives, friends, colleagues and other known
people.
9

The relative items in the questionnaire are as follows: “Are you a member of a professional association?”, “How
many?”, “In the last year, have you taken an active part in gatherings of a professional association? With which
frequency?”, “In the last year, did you make payments to fund the activity of a professional association?”

11
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

11

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 305 [2009]

5. Methodological issues
The questionnaire has been submitted in spring 2007 to a group of 82 people through customized
interviews. Participants have been selected following qualitative criteria, and do not constitute a
representative sample of the entire population. Interviewees are stakeholders belonging to a network
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) of the Italian industrial district of the Tuscia, located about
60 miles north of Rome. This case study is of general interest for various reasons. First, industrial
districts (IDs) are a central feature of the Italian model of development, largely based on the driving
force of SMEs. The extent to which such stakeholders feel confident about the social and economic
environment is a crucial factor of local development (or underdevelopment). Second, networks of
entrepreneurs running small business are unanimously considered as the glue holding together
industrial districts. Finally, the IDs-based model of development is currently facing a major
challenge, since globalization’s processes are posing a threat just to those socio-economic ties
which shape entrepreneurial networks. The group is composed by entrepreneurs and other
professionals involved in the network’s activities. More in particular, 49% of the group are
entrepreneurs (sole proprietors, owners or members of family businesses, or active shareholders),
27% are self-employed professionals strictly cooperating with entrepreneurs, and 24% are managers
or headmasters of the enterprises under consideration. The empirical analysis is structured in two
stages. The possible effect of networks on generalized trust is preliminarily assessed through a
simple probit model in section 6. Hints from the analysis are then used as the basis of a more indepth investigation into the relationships between social capital’s and trust’s various dimensions
carried out by means of structural equations models (SEMs) in section 7. Results from the empirical
analyses carried out in sections 6 and 7 are discussed in the concluding remarks of the article
(section 8).
6. Probit analysis
In this section, we carry out a first exploration of the possible determinants of social trust by means
of a probit analysis. The dependent variable Y is the probability to trust strangers (as captured
through the “Rosenberg question” described in section 3), which is equal to 1 if the interviewee
thinks that “most people can be trusted”, and 0 if he thinks that “you can’t be too careful” in dealing
with people. Thus a negative coefficient implies that including this independent variable reduces the
probability to trust others. The independent variables are bonding social capital x1, measured by the
indicator described in section 4.1, bridging social capital x2 (section 4.2), linking social capital x3
(section 4.3), corporate social capital x4 (section 4.4), knowledge-based trust x5 (section 3.3), trust in
12
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public services x6 (section 3.2, point b), trust towards political institutions x7 (section 3.2, point a).
To these dimensions of social capital and trust, we added a further explanatory variable x8 given by
“subjective safety”. The concept of “safety” can have many different meanings. The Concise Oxford
Dictionary defines it as “freedom from danger and risks”. Here we define safety as the subjective
perception that the local community is a safe place, where, for example, there is no fear of walking
alone after dusk. The indicator is computed as the arithmetic mean of the scores assigned by
respondents to a series of statements on the local community10. The probit model is as follows:
P (Y = 1 X = x ) = Φ (β 0 + β1 x1 + β 2 x 2 + β 3 x3 + β 4 x 4 + β 5 x5 + β 6 x6 + β 7 x7 + β 8 x8 )

(1)

Parameters estimates are presented in table 1:

Table 1. Parameters estimates and goodness of fit chi-square for model (1)
Variable

Regression coefficient

Coeff. / St. error

Bonding social capital

-0,0939570

-0,8773

Bridging social capital

0,0544135

0,2190

Linking social capital

0,485418

2,320

Corporate social capital

0,0977526

0,5066

Knowledge-based trust

0,252731

0,4899

Trust in political institutions

0,199306

0,3252

Trust in public services

0,601348

0,8478

Safety

2,95614

2,662

Intercept

-3,37272

-2,637

Goodness-of-fit chi square = 27,7927; DF = 8; p-value = 0,000515
Log-likelihood = -36,8378

Subjective safety and linking social capital are the only variables exhibiting a positive and
significant relationship with social trust, while the coefficients related to all the other explanatory
variables are not significant. The model predicts respondents’ attitude to trust others with a
satisfactory accuracy of 79.7 percent. The p-value indicates the probability of obtaining the

10

Statements are: “I feel safe walking down my street after dark”, “In my local community I feel at home”, “My local
community is renowned as a safe place”, “If I drop my purse or wallet in the neighbourhood, someone will see it and
return it to me”.
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goodness-of-fit chi-square statistic (27.79) if there is no effect of the independent variables, taken
together, on the dependent variable. In this case, the model is statistically significant because the
chi-square statistic is higher than the critical value with 8 degrees of freedom (27.79 > 13.36), and
the p-value is less than 0.000, so the null hypothesis is rejected.
6.1 Model refinements and robustness checks
The low significance of β2, β4, β5, and β6 suggests to test the hypothesis that x2, x4, x5, and x6, taken
together, do not affect trust in people. The null hypothesis is H 0 : β 2 = β 4 = β 5 = β 6 = 0 and the
new model is:
P (Y = 1 X = x ) = Φ(β 0 + β1 x1 + β 3 x3 + β 7 x7 + β 8 x8 )

[( )

(2)

]

The likelihood chi-square test statistic is calculated as 2 l βˆ − l (β 0 ) , where l (β 0 ) is the log-

()

likelihood under the null hypothesis (-37,2944) and l β̂ is the log-likelihood of model (1). Its value

is equal to 0,913264, which is lower than the critical value of the chi-square with four degrees of
freedom at 0.100 level of significance (7.78), so the null hypothesis is not rejected and bridging and
corporate social capital (x2 and x4), knowledge-based trust x5 and trust towards political institutions
x6 can be excluded from the model. Model (2) is statistically significant because the chi-square
statistic is higher than the critical value for 4 degrees of freedom (27,27 > 7.78), and the p-value is
less than 0.000, so the null hypothesis that all parameters are equal to zero is rejected. The probit
equation predicts respondents’ attitude to trust others with a satisfactory accuracy of 75,0 percent.
Parameters estimates for model (2) are reported in table 2.

Table 2. Parameters estimates and goodness of fit chi-square for model (2)
Variable

Regression coefficient

Coeff. / St. error

Bonding social capital

-0,0863525

-0,8470

Linking social capital

0,525065

2,665

Trust in public services

0,475110

0,7862

Safety

3,07526

2,867

Intercept

-3,02953

-3,384

Goodness-of-fit chi square = 27,2713; DF = 4; p-value = 0,000018
Log-likelihood = -37,5134
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The model’s results suggest that people feeling that the surrounding environment is safe exhibit a
higher probability to be high-trusters. Subjective safety is the variable exerting the highest positive
and significant influence on generalized trust. Linking social capital also positively and
significantly correlates with trust, but to a weaker extent. The model is robust to the addition of a
series of control variables, like the educational qualification of respondents, their age, work status
and firm size.
7. SEM analysis

Goldberger defines a SEM as “A stochastic model where each equation represents a causal linkage,
rather than a simple empirical association” (Goldberger, 1972, 979). SEMs are composed by
regression equations, which are included in the model only so far as it is possible to interpret them
as causal relationships, theoretically justifiable and not falsified by data (Garson, 2008). While
designing the structural model, the researcher puts forward some hypotheses on the linkages
connecting the phenomena under consideration. The consistency of such hypotheses with the
pattern of variances and covariances in the data is then assessed through the goodness-of-fit tests. In
practice, this approach combines exploratory and confirmatory purposes: first, a model is theorized
and tested using SEM procedures. If it is found to be deficient, an alternative model is then tested
based on changes suggested by SEM modification indexes. However, it must be stated that, as other
unexamined models may fit the data as well or better, an accepted model should be considered only
as a not-disconfirmed model. Thus, even if the use of SEMs certainly allows us to make a further
step towards a better understanding of the multifaceted effects of social capital, the problem of
causality still remains open to question, and causal ambiguities are not solved. A peculiarity of
SEMs is the possibility to account for other parameters in addition to structural

β linking

endogenous and exogenous variables. More precisely, it is possible to account for variances and
covariances among errors ε, which play a decisive role in defining the model presented in this
paper. The matrix Ψ of covariances among errors ζ has been carefully defined in each of the models
that have been tested within the analysis, with the aim to account for variables which, although not
explicitly considered within the model, may play a role in the real scenario described by observed
data.
Let η1 be linking social capital, η2 knowledge-based trust, η3 trust in public services, η4 generalized
or social trust, η5 subjective safety, ξ1 bonding social capital, ξ2 corporate social capital, ξ3 bridging
social capital. ζi, with i = (1,…, 5) are the errors related to endogenous variables. In the model with
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the best goodness of fit, linking social capital is influenced by social trust, subjective safety, and
other unknown factors affecting also confidence in public services and generalized trust:

η1 = β 41η 4 + β 51η 5 + ζ 1

(3)

Knowledge-based trust is mostly affected by bonding and bridging social capital:

η 2 = γ 21ξ1 + γ 23ξ 3 + ζ 3

(4)

Trust in public services is affected by linking and bridging social capital and by other variables
influencing also linking social capital:

η 3 = β 31η1 + γ 33ξ 3 + ζ 3

(5)

Social trust is affected by linking, bridging, and corporate social capital, confidence in public
services, subjective safety, and other unknown factors influencing also civic engagement:

η 4 = β 41η1 + β 43η 3 + β 45η 5 + γ 42ξ 2 + γ 43ξ 3 + ζ 4

(6)

Subjective safety is influenced by linking social capital:

η 5 = β 51η1 + ζ 5

(7)

Errors ζ 3 and ζ 1 , and ζ 4 and ζ 1 are correlated. This implies the need to estimate, besides
parameters β , also covariances ϕ between errors. In the model, other assumptions are carried out
to the seek of simplicity: independent variables and errors are not correlated in the same
equation: E (ξζ ') = 0 ; structural equations are not redundant; this condition means that η -equations
are independent between them, and each endogenous variable η can not be a linear combination of
the others; finally, we have supposed that all variables have been measured without errors, therefore
there is a perfect identity between latent and observed variables. This allows us to omit
measurement models for endogenous and exogenous variables and to focus exclusively on the
structural equations model and on the explanation of the causal relationships linking variables.
Combining equations from (3) to (7) with the error covariance matrix, we can write the model as:
16
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η1   0
η   β
 2   21
η 3  =  β 31
  
η 4   β 41
η 5   β 51

0

0

β14

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 β 43

0

0

0

0

β15  η1   0
0
0 




0  η 2  γ 21 γ 22 0 


0  ⋅ η 3  +  0
0 γ 33  ⋅ [ξ1 ξ 2 ξ 3 ]
   

β 45  η 4   0 γ 42 γ 43 
0  η 5   0
0
0 

 1
 0

ψ 31

ψ 41
 0

1
0
0
0




 (8)
1

0 1 
0 0 1

It is noteworthy that the absence of a variable from the model can arise in two ways: a) a
relationship was originally assumed to be insignificant for conceptual reasons; b) or a relationship
was hypothesized to be potentially significant but was empirically found not to be. For example,
variables ξ1 and ξ 2 (bonding and bridging social capital) were allowed to enter in equation (7)
describing subjective safety. They do not appear in the model because they were statistically
insignificant when allowed to enter, not because they were excluded in the first place.
Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the model. The graphic representation of SEMs
follows the path analysis symbology. It reports the variables, their errors and the linkages
connecting variables. Such connections are represented both graphically, by arrows, and
numerically, by regression coefficients. Latent variables are inscribed in an ellipse, while observed
variables in a rectangle. In model (8) all variables are inscribed in ellipses, due to the hypothesis
that variables have been measured without errors. The causal nexus between two variables is
represented by a straight arrow moving from the independent variable to the dependent variable.
The association (covariation) between two variables is represented by a bidirectional curved arrow
connecting them. The absence of arrows means the hypothesis of the absence of linkages between
variables, or the statistical insignificance of such linkages.
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Figure 1. Path diagram of model (8)
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The model excellently fits the data and all the goodness of fit indexes exhibit satisfactory values
(goodness of fit measures are briefly described in Annex A). Parameters estimates are presented in
Table 3, where blank cells represent coefficients constrained to be zero.
The results suggest that social trust is positively and significantly affected by subjective safety and,
to a quite lesser extent, by confidence in public services and corporate social capital. According to
the SEM analysis, there is a negative significant association between trust in people and civic
engagement through voluntary organizations. Associational participation seems to be negatively
influenced by subjective safety, but is significantly reinforced by social trust. Such correlation
suggests the possibility that high-trusters are more inclined to civic engagement and tend to selfselect into voluntary organizations. Corporate ties positively and significantly affect trust towards
strangers and, to a higher extent, knowledge-based trust among entrepreneurs.

18
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Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates for model (8)
Linking
social
capital

Knowledge
based trust

Trust in
public
services

Linking
social capital

Social
trust

Subjective
safety

2.79
(0.24)
11.74

-2.26
0.22
-10.46

Knowledgebased trust
Trust in
public
services

-0.24
(0.17)
-1.36

Social trust

-0.61
(0.11)
-5.38

Subjective
safety

0.31
(0.22)
1.41

Bonding
social
capital

Corporate
social
capital

0.19
(0.11)
1.67

0.31
(0.11)
2.73

Bridging
social
capital

-0.39
(0.12)
-3.41
0.48
(0.18)
2.59

0.70
(0.21)
3.33

0.25
(0.11)
2.24

0.03
(0.13)
0.26

These results are robust to different model specifications. First, in the process of refining the
theoretical model and testing its consistency with the data, we have estimated some refinements
resulting from the inclusion of additional parameters, accounting for the possible existence of
further linkages connecting the variables under consideration. Second, we tested the model again
after the inclusion of the same control variables adopted within the probit analysis in section 6, i.e.
educational qualification, age, work status and firm size. In any of these cases, the sign, the size,
and the significance of the parameters’ estimates presented in Table 3 changed significantly, nor the
overall goodness of fit of the model worsened.
The findings from the SEM analysis partly contradict the results of the probit analysis performed in
section 6, which suggested the possibility of a positive influence of linking social capital on social
trust. In order to test the self-selection hypothesis advanced in this section, we run a new probit
analysis where linking social capital – as measured by a very simple indicator capturing
membership in associations – is the dependent variable, and generalized trust is moved to the
second member. Differently from section 6, generalized trust is now measured by the score assigned
to the statement “most people can be trusted” (see section 3.1). Membership is a binary variable,
which is equal to one when the respondent is member of at least one association, and 0 if the
interviewee does not belong to any organization. The probit equation is as follows:
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P (Y = 1 X = x ) = Φ (β 0 + β1 x1 + β 2 x 2 + β 3 x3 + β 4 x 4 + β 5 x5 + β 6 x6 + β 7 x7 + β 8 x8 )

(9)

with xi (i = 1,…, 8) having the same meaning as in section 6 with the only exception of x3, now
representing generalized trust. Parameters’ estimates are presented in Table 4:

Table 4. Parameters estimates and goodness of fit chi-square for model (9)
Variable

Regression coefficient

Coeff. / St. error

Bonding social capital

-0,00285917

-0,02569

Bridging social capital

0,730843

2,547

Social trust

0,822198

2,426

Corporate social capital

0,493714

2,319

Knowledge-based trust

-0,825483

-1,402

Trust in political institutions

0,175118

0,2664

Trust in public services

1,11666

1,368

Safety

-1,30771

-0,5570

Intercept

-4,57651

-2,973

Goodness-of-fit chi square = 31,9419; DF = 8; p-value = 0,000095
Log-likelihood = -33,3384

Results from the SEM analysis are confirmed: social trust positively and significantly affects
linking social capital, thereby supporting the self-selection hypothesis. An interesting additional
finding is given by the positive and significant influence of bridging and corporate social capital on
social participation11. Due to the insignificance of β1 , β 5 , β 6 , β 7 , β 8 , we have tested the null
hypothesis H 0 : β1 = β 5 = β 6 = β 7 = β 8 = 0 . The new equation is:
P (Y = 1 X = x ) = Φ (β 0 + β 2 x2 + β 3 x3 + β 4 x 4 )

(10)

11

The model predicts membership in associations with a satisfactory accuracy of 75.9 percent. The model is
statistically significant because the chi-square statistic is higher than the critical value with 8 degrees of freedom (31.94
> 13.36), and the p-value is less than 0.000, so the null hypothesis that all parameters are equal to zero is rejected.
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As it is reported in Table 5, results are confirmed12.

Table 5. Parameters estimates and goodness of fit chi-square for model (10)
Variable

Regression coefficient

Coeff. / St. error

Social trust

0,583801

3,930

Bridging social capital

0,506589

2,142

Corporate social capital

0,371674

2,057

Intercept

-4,10780

-4,066

Goodness-of-fit chi square = 28,5839; DF = 3; p-value = 0,000003
Log-likelihood = -36,9288

8. Discussion of results and concluding remarks

The essay has carried out an empirical investigation into the determinants of trust in other people
within a community of entrepreneurs running small and medium businesses in the context of an
industrial district. The results suggest that the main factors fostering social trust are a sense of safety
(i.e. the perception that the local community is a safe place), confidence in public services, and, to a
quite lesser extent, corporate ties created through membership in professional associations.
Confidence in public services is knowledge-based, in the sense that it probably reflects respondent’s
experience about their efficiency. Our empirical analysis suggests that extensive and efficient
services may reinforce trust in other people. The transmission mechanism has been already
analyzed by Kumlin and Rothstein (2005), who find that contacts with universal welfare-state
institutions and efficient public services tend to increase social trust in Sweden. According to the
authors, citizens in developed welfare states frequently come into direct personal contact with many
different types of public agencies and services. The court system, public healthcare, and public
transports are but a few examples of this. In many cases, such institutions can be pervasive factors
in people’s daily lives. So, “It is reasonable to suspect that people’s views of the society around
them and of their fellow human beings are shaped to a great extent through their contacts with such
12

The likelihood chi-square test statistic’s value is 4,71957, which is lower than the critical value of the chi-square with
5 degrees of freedom at 0.100 level of significance (9.24), so the null hypothesis is not rejected and bonding social
capital, knoledge-based trust, confidence in public services, and trust towards political institutions can be excluded from
the model. Model (10) is statistically significant because the chi-square statistic is higher than the critical value for 3
degrees of freedom (28,5839 > 6.25), and the p-value is less than 0.000, so the null hypothesis that all parameters are
equal to zero is rejected. The probit equation predicts membership in associations with a satisfactory accuracy of 74.4
percent.

21
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

21

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 305 [2009]

public state institutions” (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005, 349). This argument is based upon the
concept of procedural justice (Rawls, 1971), which has been used in the psychological research to
show that people are concerned not only with the final results of personal contacts with public
institutions, but also in whether the process that eventually led to the final result can be seen as fair
(Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Kumlin and Rothstein suggest that there are
numerous aspects of procedural justice involved in citizens’ relations with public services provided
by the state. “These may involve questions of whether the individual was received with respect and
dignity, whether he or she was able to communicate opinions to the civil servants, if there are signs
of discrimination or corruption” (2005, 350).
The positive association between corporate social capital and both knowledge-based and social trust
was expected and sounds quite evident. In a small community, entrepreneurs can use membership in
a professional association as an effective mean to establish linking ties with agents belonging to
other socio-economic categories, like people in the institutions or strangers operating in other
sectors of the economy. The strength of such ties reduces social distances, thereby fostering the
perception that both strangers and people in the institutions may be treated as if they were known
and trustworthy through at least three channels:
- even if there is not a history of past interaction with people in the institutions, the condition of
belonging to an association raises the likelihood to interact with them again in the future.
- Associations are a powerful means for acquiring information on strangers. Moreover, the higher
likelihood to repeat interactions raises the possibility of retaliation in case of free-riding.
- When they belong to a group, entrepreneurs do not feel defenceless against opportunist
behaviours. So they are less anxious and do not need to be on the defensive every time they interact
with strangers. This could lead to a more open-minded and trusting attitude towards “the others”.
Adopting Uslaner’s (2002) terminology, we could state that the linking role played by certain
networks enables the extension of the knowledge-based trust to unknown people, fostering the
accumulation of social trust. This is not properly moralistic trust in the sense suggested by Uslaner,
but an extension to strangers of the knowledge-based trust described by Yamagishi (1998). In other
words, associations may act as a catalyst for the transformation of particularized trust into
generalized trust, which in turn fosters the economic activity. Such a mechanism is a relevant policy
tool in social environments which are not characterized by a deep tradition of participation and
shared values.
On the contrary, civic engagement through voluntary organizations is found to be negatively and
significantly associated with the social trust of entrepreneurs. These results are only apparently
conflicting with Putnam’s (1993) claims on the positive role of civil society and Olson’s (1965)
22
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper305

22

Sabatini: Does Social Capital Create Trust? Evidence from a Community

arguments “against” professional associations reported in section 4.4. Professional associations
have for entrepreneurs the same “linking” role which Putnam (1993) attributes to civil society
organizations in reference to the entire population. Even if such ties may be used to pursue special
interests generating social costs and worsening social cohesion, they certainly reinforce
entrepreneurs’ self-confidence and trust in others.
Engagement in associations seems to be significantly reinforced by social trust. Such correlation
suggests that, even though individuals who join groups and who interact with others regularly show
attitudinal and behavioural differences compared to nonjoiners, the possibility exists that people
self-select into association groups, depending on their original levels of generalized trust and
reciprocity. This result has some precedent in the literature: using survey data on Norway,
Wollebaek and Selle (2003) show that participating in voluntary organizations does not increase
trust in other people. Rather, the correlation between high levels of membership in organizations
and higher trust seems to be created by “reversed causation”. Grounding on survey data collected in
Germany and Sweden, Stolle (1998) finds evidence of the existence of a selection bias: people who
join associations are significantly more trusting than people who do not join.
This phenomenon can be explained through the influence that attitude similarity exerts on
attraction. Perceived similarity of others in attitudes and opinions about social issues is a key factor
in determining our choice to approach them (Byrne, Ervin and Lamberth, 1970, Byrne, 1971, Duck,
1975). Moreover, people with high generalized trust tend to be quicker in the perception of value
similarity of others than those with low generalized trust (Siegrist, Earle and Gutscher, 2003). Thus,
they are more likely to join social networks and to engage together in collective actions.
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Annex A. Goodness of fit measures

Measures of the model’s goodness of fit are a function of the residual, i.e. the difference between
the empirical variance-covariance matrix and the model-created variance-covariance matrix. It is
possible to show (Bonnet and Bentler, 1983), that, if the model is correct, the fitting statistic follows
a χ 2 with df degrees of freedom, where df =

1
( p + q)( p + q + 1) − t , p is the number of
2

endogenous variables, q is the number of exogenous variables, and t is the number of estimated
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parameters. In order to evaluate the goodness of fit, the residual function for the model must be
compared with critical values reported in χ 2 distribution tables with a probability P = 0.100. Since
the value for model (8) is significantly lower than the critical value for a χ 2 with 16 degrees of
freedom, we can state that the difference between the two variance-covariance matrixes is stochastic
in nature, and is not due to the inappropriateness of the theoretical model. All the other goodness of
fit indexes exhibit satisfactory values.
The Goodness of Fit Index (GFI):

GFI = 1 −

T
max (Ti )

is equal to 0.98. This means a good fit.
The Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) takes into account also the model’s number of degrees
of freedom, i.e. its parsimoniousness:
 k
AGFI = 1 − 
 df


(1 − GFI )


where df are degrees of freedom, and k is the number of variances-covariances in input; k is given
by:

k=

1
( p + q)( p + q + 1)
2

The AGFI is equal to 0.96, thus indicating a good fit.
The Root mean squared residuals (RMR) is:

RMR =

(

)

1
Σ sij − σ ij 2
k

is equal to 0 when the theoretical model-generated variance-covariance matrix fits the empirical
matrix, and infinitely grows when the model’s goodness of fit worsens. The RMR of model (8) is
equal to 0.041, thus indicating a good fit.
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